A Quitclaim deed is defined as follows:
A deed of conveyance operating by way of release; that is, intended to pass any title, interest, or claim which the grantor may have in the premises, but not professing that such title is valid, nor containing any warranty or covenants for title. Black's Law Dictionary.
The purpose is for an individual to convey away any real or perceived interest in a piece of real estate and can encompass one property or all property in the county.
You do not receive the legal assurance of the general warranty of title when a quit claim deed is used.
All the recording requirements for deeds are the same for a quit claim deed with the exception of a specific source of title. Accordingly a statement of consideration is required. See section on Deed.
Excerpts from ARNETT ET AL. v. STEPHENS ET AL.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky. June 12, 1923.
There is a well-recognized distinction between a deed which purports to convey the land itself without a warranty of title and one which purports to convey only the right, title, and interest of the vendor.
An instrument which merely purports to convey the right, title, and interest of the grantor is a "quitclaim deed," and the grantee thereunder is not a bona fide purchaser protected against outstanding equities.
 The rule has been modified somewhat with respect to quitclaim deeds and other written muniments (documentary evidence of title) of title which have been made recordable under the acts of the several states requiring such instrument to be recorded before effective against purchasers and creditors. The general rule seems to be that a quitclaim deed, in the strictest sense, which purports to convey only the right, title, and interest of the vendor, if recorded, will prevail over a deed of bargain and sale, which is unrecorded or which was executed and recorded after the recordation of the quitclaim. But this rule applies only to deeds and other writings purporting to convey title or an interest in the property and has no reference whatever to and can have no application whatever to outstanding equities which are not evidenced by such deed or other writing. This modification of the common-law rule with respect to quitclaim deeds is rested solely upon the legislative acts of the several states requiring conveyances of real estate to be recorded, and these acts relate only to such written muniments of title as are capable of being recorded. It does not affect or in any way change the prevailing rule that outstanding equities, not evidenced by such writing, are not concluded by a quitclaim deed; and a purchaser who takes only the right, title, and interest of his vendor to real property is not clothed with the protection afforded a bona fide purchaser with respect to outstanding equities not evidenced by a recordable writing, but protects him only according to the terms of the act requiring the lodgment for record of all deeds and other title papers. The rule is well stated in Hendricks v. Calloway, 211 Mo. 536, 111 S. W. 60; Starr v. Bartz, 219 Mo. 47, 117 S. W. 1125, where it is, in substance, held that a quitclaim deed does not bar outstanding equities which are not the subject of record and to which the recording act does not apply. Equities which arise from transactions or a state of facts which are not required to be in writing, or which need not be recorded, if in writing, are not to be cut off by a quitclaim deed. As to such it has only an effect, coextensive with its terms, of recognizing such rights and interest as the grantor had at the time of the conveyance. The land in the hands of a purchaser under a quitclaim deed remains subject to such equities.
 An instrument which merely purports to convey the right, title, and interest of the grantor is a quitclaim deed and the vendee is not a bona fide holder. ...
A bona fide purchaser of a quitclaim title only is not protected, while the bona fide purchaser of a legal title is secure.
"The doctrine which protects a bona fide purchaser without notice is applicable solely to purchasers of a legal title; the purchaser of an equitable interest purchases at his peril, and acquires the property burdened with every prior equity charged upon it. Where, therefore, a party, having, at most, an equitable estate in lands the legal title to which is in a trustee for a syndicate, mortgages such lands, the mortgage is void." Shoufe v. Griffiths, 4 Wash. 161, 30 Pac. 93, 31 Am. St. Rep. 910.
If the deed purports and is intended to convey only the right, title, and interest in the land, as distinguished from the land itself, it comes within the strict sense of a quitclaim deed and will not sustain the defense of innocent purchaser. 39 Cyc. 1694; Webb v. Elyton Land Co., 105 Ala. 471, 18 South. 178; Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 87 Tex. 520, 12 S. W. 757.
No covenants of title are implied in an assignment of a lease contract--such assignment only puts the assignee in the same place as was the assignor. 16 R. C. L. 843; note 32 Am. Dec. 356.
 In addition to the foregoing it is a rule generally recognized that a deed, which is only quitclaim in form, is sufficient to put the grantee upon notice that his grantor has doubts concerning the sufficiency of his title, and the deed itself is notice to him that he is getting a doubtful title. Knox v. Doty, 81 Kan. 138, 105 Pac. 437, 135 Am. St. Rep. 351.
 It is often stated that the purchaser who receives a quitclaim deed must be presumed to have taken it with notice of all outstanding equities and interests of which he could by the exercise of reasonable diligence have obtained notice by an examination of all the records effecting the title of the property, and from all inquiries which he might make of persons in possession of the property, or of persons paying taxes thereon, or of any person who might, from any record or from any knowledge which the purchaser might have, seemingly have some interest in the property. This latter rule applies.